A view on conditional measures through local representability of binary relations  by Coletti, Giulianella & Vantaggi, Barbara
Available online at www.sciencedirect.comInternational Journal of Approximate Reasoning
47 (2008) 268–283
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijarA view on conditional measures through local representability
of binary relations
Giulianella Coletti a,*, Barbara Vantaggi b
a Dip. Matematica e Informatica, Universita` di Perugia, Italy
b Dip. Metodi e Modelli Matematici, Universita` ‘‘La Sapienza’’ Roma, Italy
Received 25 October 2006; received in revised form 14 February 2007; accepted 25 May 2007
Available online 30 June 2007Abstract
We consider binary relations  admitting a conditional measure of uncertainty u (precisely plausibility, possibility and
their dual functions), which locally represents : for every pair A  B, the measure uðjCÞ almost represents for any
hypothesis C  A _ B, and represents  under the most speciﬁc hypothesis C ¼ A _ B.
 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.
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Any assessment of an (unconditional) uncertainty measure on a setA of events can be seen as the relevant
degrees of belief measured by a scale ‘‘calibrated’’ for taking into account all the events at the same time; in
other words any event is regarded as embedded on the macrocosm consisting of the complete family. Obvi-
ously in this macrocontext it is possible that some diﬀerences among the degrees of belief are not captured
through this scale (unconditional measure). On the contrary the diﬀerence of the degrees of belief of any
two events will emerge when we consider the microcosm consisting of just the two events, and so by using
a more sensible scale.
The model apt to manage this complex system, in which diﬀerent hypotheses (or information) are taken
into account simultaneously, is a conditional uncertainty measure, where we consider it in the most general
way, that is as a primitive concept. The main feature of such an approach resides in adopting a direct intro-
duction of the conditional measure as a function whose domain is a set of conditional events EjH , so that it
can be deﬁned for any pair of events E,H inA, with H 6¼ ;. Therefore in this context conditioning is not just a
trivial modiﬁcation of the ‘‘world’’. In fact, it is essential to regard conditioning events as ‘‘variables’’ or, in
other words, as uncertain events which can be either true or false.0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.
doi:10.1016/j.ijar.2007.05.007
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same time all the possible scenarios (represented by the relevant conditioning events).
Starting from probability [25,40,41] many models based on a direct deﬁnition of conditional uncertainty
measures have been given in literature (see, for instance, [21,4–6,13,15,16,18,33,11]).
Nevertheless the discussion about the ‘‘best’’ deﬁnition of conditional model is open for some well-known
measures of uncertainty such as belief functions or necessity functions.
By going along the same lines of the theory of measurements [38], in this paper we give a contribution to
this discussion under a diﬀerent perspective by studying the comparative framework underling a conditional
model.
More precisely we characterize binary relations (ordinal degrees of belief) locally representable, admitting a
speciﬁc conditional measure uðjÞ such that for every E; F ;H 2A, with H  E _ F we have:E  F ) uðEjHÞ 6 uðF jHÞ;
E  F ) uðEjE _ F Þ < uðF jE _ F Þ:
ðÞThis approach gives an estimate of the ‘‘goodness’’ and ‘‘eﬀectiveness’’ of the model, by pointing out the rules
necessarily accepted by the user. This is particularly useful in the case where there are many numerical models.
In fact, it puts clearly in evidence the lacks of some conditioning operators or some unexpected similarities
among the conditional measures: for instance in some cases we obtain not transitive relations; while in other
cases the characterizing condition is not deducible by that characterizing the unconditional measure of refer-
ence, but it is (locally) stronger.
On the other hand to handle binary relations agreeing with some numerical uncertainty model is interesting
per se. In fact, in many situations the ﬁeld expert or the decision maker, due to his partial knowledge, is not
able, or interested, to give a numerical ‘‘even if partial’’ evaluation. In such situations, we are content with
getting (from the decision maker) an ordinal evaluation  comparing some uncertain alternatives. In this com-
parative setting it is possible to note that the expert or decision maker focuses his attention just on the two
events object of the comparison and so he expresses a relation capturing diﬀerences so ﬁne that cannot agree
with an unconditional measure (see for instance [1,39,3]).
For this reason it is interesting to study the representability of binary relations locally representable by a
conditional measure.
This problem has been faced in [12,9,10] inside a probabilistic framework, and in [14] also for general
decomposable measures. Furthermore, decision models based on this context are presented in [26,39,3].
In this paper we look for conditions for local representability of a binary relation by a conditional plausi-
bility, a conditional belief function, a conditional possibility and a conditional necessity. For conditional belief
and possibilities diﬀerent conditional rules have been taken into account.
2. Comparative degree of belief
LetA be an algebra of events: denote by  a binary relation onA and, as usual, A  B denotes that A  B
and :ðB  AÞ; while A  B stands for A  B and B  A. If we give the sentence ‘‘u representing ’’ the mean-
ing of , ‘‘u being strictly monotone with  ’’, then for any choice of a capacity function u as numerical frame-
work of reference, it is necessary that  satisﬁes the following conditions:
(1)  is a weak order on the algebra A;
(2) for any A 2A, ;  A and ;  X;
(3) for any A;G 2AA  G) A  G:
When we specialize the capacity function (probability, belief, plausibility, and so on) representing , then we
need to add to the above axioms a speciﬁc relevant condition, which essentially expresses a (more or less
strong) sort of ‘‘comparative additivity’’. The ﬁrst (and the best known) additivity axiom [25,36] is the
following:
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E  F ) E _ H  F _ H ;
E  F ) E _ H  F _ H :In fact the above axiom (p) is a necessary condition for the representability of  with an additive function with
values in a totally ordered set (also, for instance, the set of non-standard real numbers). If we refer instead to
more general measures of uncertainty, such as belief functions, plausibilities and so on, then it is easy to see
that (p) can be violated.
Nevertheless, also in this case a weaker additivity axiom is necessary; see, for this aspect, the following con-
ditions (b) and (pl) given in [45,7,19]: the ﬁrst one characterizing relations representable by a belief function
and the second one by plausibility. Further conditions (PO), (NEC) introduced in [30] (see also [32]),
characterize relations representable by a possibility and a necessity respectively:
(b) if E; F ;H 2A, with E 	 F and F ^ H ¼ ; , then
E  F ) ðE _ HÞ  ðF _ HÞ:(pl) if E; F ;H 2A, with E 	 F and F ^ H ¼ ; , then
E  F ) ðE _ HÞ  ðF _ HÞ:(PO) for every A;G;H 2A
A  G) ðA _ HÞ  ðG _ HÞ:(NEC) for every A;B;C 2A
A  B) ðA ^ CÞ  ðB ^ CÞ:The above conditions are related to a framework in which a decision maker (or ﬁeld expert) considers at any
step of the decision (of knowledge acquisition) process all the events at the same time. Nevertheless, this par-
adigm can cause a rough estimation of the (comparative) degree of belief on the events: then many events can be
necessarily considered equivalent among them and, perhaps, to the impossible or to the certain event. Never-
theless, if the decision maker considers the same events in a more speciﬁc context (for instance in the hypothesis
that at least one of them is true), then he should express a diﬀerent degree of belief. In other words we consider
binary relations  admitting a conditional measure uð; Þ, which almost represents  under any hypothesis H
(i.e. A  B) uðAjHÞ 6 uðBjHÞ) and represents when for any pair A;B we consider them under the most spe-
ciﬁc hypothesis that is A _ B. More precisely, we say that uð; Þ locally represents  if the condition (*)
holds.
In this context axiom (2) is replaced by the following stronger one
(2*) for any A 2A, ;  A.
Moreover, the basic axiom is the following:
(cp) for E; F ;H ;E _ H ; F _ H 2A, with E ^ H ¼ F ^ H ¼ ;
E  F ) E _ H  F _ H ;moreover, if H  F _ H or F  H , then
E  F ) E _ H  F _ H :In fact any binary relation locally representable by a conditional probability satisﬁes the ﬁrst implication of
(p), while the second one can be violated when P ðE _ F jE _ F _ HÞ ¼ 0.
We recall that (see [12,9]) axiom (cp) is a condition only necessary for the representability of the relation by
a conditional probability: in fact any necessary and suﬃcient condition involves the indicator functions of the
events (as proved in [9,10,14]).
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In [13] a general class of (decomposable) conditional measures is introduced; we recall here some deﬁnitions
and results:
Deﬁnition 1. Given a boolean algebraA, a weakly 
-decomposable measure u :A! ½0; 1 is a capacity such
that there exists an operation 
 from uðAÞ  uðAÞ to real numbers satisfying the following condition: for
every Ei;Ej 2A, with Ei ^ Ej ¼ ;,uðEi _ EjÞ ¼ uðEiÞ 
 uðEjÞ:
It is easy to see that, with respect to the elements of the following subset:K ¼ fðuðEiÞ;uðEjÞÞ : Ei;Ej 2A;Ei ^ Ej ¼ ;g  uðAÞ  uðAÞ
the operation 
 is commutative, associative, increasing and admits 0 as neutral element.
Note that 
 is not necessarily a triangular conorm, since it is commutative and associative just onK and it
is not necessarily extendible on ½0; 1  ½0; 1 by preserving the above properties (see e.g. [13]).
This class contains plausibility, belief function and (obviously) the class of decomposable measure contain-
ing probability, possibility and necessity.
Deﬁnition 2. Given a family C ¼AH of conditional events, whereA is a boolean algebra,H an additive
set, with H 	A and ; 62H, a real function u deﬁned on C is a weakly ð
;Þ-decomposable conditional
measure if
(c1) uðEjHÞ ¼ uðE ^ H jHÞ, for every E 2A and H 2H,
(c2) there exists an operation 
 : uðCÞ  uðCÞ ! uðCÞ whose restriction to the setD ¼ fðuðEijHÞ;uðEjjHÞÞ : Ei;Ej 2A;H 2Hg;
with Ei ^ Ej ^ H ¼ ;, is (commutative, associative and) increasing, admits 0 as neutral element, and is such
that, for any given H 2H, uðjHÞ is a weakly 
-decomposable measure,
(c3) there exists an operation  : uðCÞ  uðCÞ ! uðCÞ whose restriction to the setC ¼ fðuðEjHÞ;uðAjE ^ HÞÞ : A 2A;E;H ;E ^ H 2Hg
is (commutative, associative and) increasing, admits 1 as neutral element and is such that, for any A;E 2A
and E, E ^ H 2H,uððE ^ AÞjHÞ ¼ uðEjHÞ  uðAjðE ^ HÞÞ:
(c4) The operation  is distributive over 
 for relations of the kinduðH jKÞ  ðuðEjH ^ KÞ 
 uðF jH ^ KÞÞ;
with K;H ^ K 2H, E ^ F ^ H ^ K ¼ ;.In the sequel we recall explicitly the deﬁnitions of T-conditional possibility (with T a triangular norm [35])
as introduced in [4,5] and conditional plausibility (see for instance [11]), which are particular weakly ð
;Þ-
decomposable conditional measure. The relevant dual conditional functions are deﬁned by duality as follow:
given a conditional possibility [plausibility] uðjÞ, a conditional necessity [belief function] wðjÞ is, for every
event EjH 2 C:wðEjHÞ ¼ 1 uðEcjHÞ:Deﬁnition 3. LetAH be a ﬁnite set of conditional events EjH such thatA is a Boolean algebra andH an
additive set withH A and ; 62H. A functionP :AH! ½0; 1 is a T-conditional possibility if it satisﬁes
the following properties:
272 G. Coletti, B. Vantaggi / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 47 (2008) 268–2831. PðEjHÞ ¼ PðE ^ H jHÞ, for every E 2A and H 2H;
2. PðjHÞ is a possibility measure, for every H 2H;
3. for every H ;E ^ H 2H and E; F 2APðE ^ F jHÞ ¼ T ðPðEjHÞ;PðF jE ^ HÞÞ:
We will say simply ‘‘conditional possibility’’ a T-conditional possibility with T ¼ min.
Deﬁnition 4. A function Pl deﬁned onAH is a conditional plausibility if satisﬁes the following conditions:
(a1) PlðEjHÞ ¼ PlðEH jHÞ;
(a2) PlðjHÞ is a plausibility function for every H 2H;
(a3) For every E 2A and H ;K 2HPlðEjKÞ ¼ PlðEjHÞ  PlðH jKÞ:We note that the conditional belief function BelDðjÞ obtained by duality as mentioned before, i.e.
BelDðEjHÞ ¼ 1 PlðEcjHÞ, is the natural generalization of that given by Dempster in [28] deeply studied in
[29].
In the literature there are many other deﬁnitions of conditional belief (and plausibility) (see for instance
[44,34,43,2]) also introduced in terms of weakly ð
;Þ-decomposable conditional measure (see [16]). We will
not study the binary relations represented by all them, but we make a short discussion in sections 6.2 and 6.3,
about conditional belief functions deﬁned by using product rule and the formula known as ‘‘Bayes rule’’,
respectively. In particular, we denote by BelP ð; Þ a conditional belief obtained through the product
rule, i.e. the operation  of Deﬁnition 2 consists into the classical product BelðE ^ H jKÞ ¼
BelðEjH ^ KÞBelðH jKÞ for any E;H 2A and H ^ K;K 2H, and in the case X 2H then for any conditioning
event B such that BelðBÞ > 0 one has BelP ðAjBÞ ¼ BelðA^BÞBelðBÞ .
On the other hand, a conditional belief obtained through Bayes rule is denoted by BelBð; Þ and is obtained
when X 2H for any pair of events A;B 2A such that BelðA ^ BÞ þ PlðAc ^ BÞ > 0 as BelðAjBÞ ¼
BelðA^BÞ
BelðA^BÞþPlðAc^BÞ.
Finally we recall the following characterization result, directly proved in [11], which is in fact a particular
case of a general result given in [13]:
Theorem 5. Let E ¼AH be a finite set of conditional events EjH such that A is an algebra and H an
additive set with H A and ; 62H. For a function BelD on E the following statements are equivalent:
(a) BelD is a conditional belief on E;
(b) There exists (at least) a class fPlag of plausibility functions such that, called H a0 the greatest set ofH for
which Plða1ÞðH a1Þ ¼ 0, results PlaðH a1Þ ¼ 1 and H a1  Hb1 for all b < a. Moreover, for every EijF i, there
exists an a such that, PlbðF iÞ ¼ 0 for all b < a, and PlaðF iÞ > 0 andBelDðEijF iÞ ¼ 1 PlaðE
c
i ^ F iÞ
PlaðF iÞ : ð1ÞThe class of plausibilities Pla in condition (b) of Theorem 5 is formed by more than one element whenever
there are events inH with zero plausibility and we can say that Pl1 gives a reﬁnement of those events judged
with zero plausibility under Pl0. This shows that conditional belief functions, as well as conditional plausibil-
ity, are more general than belief functions (or, respectively, plausibility).
The following example shows the construction of the class of fPlag characterizing (in the sense of the above
result) a conditional belief.
Example 6. Let fC1; . . . ;C5g be a partition, A the corresponding algebra and H ¼ fC1 _ C5;C2 _ C3 _ C4;
C1 _ C2 _ C5;Xg is an additive set.
Consider the following function f deﬁned as follows on AH:
for K 2 fX;C2 _ C3 _ C4g and H 	 C1 _ C5
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f ðC2jKÞ ¼ f ðC2 _ H jKÞ ¼ f ðC2 _ C4jKÞ ¼ f ðC2 _ C4 _ H jKÞ ¼ 0:5;
f ðC3 _ C4jKÞ ¼ f ðC3 _ C4 _ H jKÞ ¼ 0:2;
f ðC2 _ C3jKÞ ¼ f ðC2 _ C3 _ H jKÞ ¼ 0:8;
f ðC2 _ C3 _ C4jKÞ ¼ f ðC2 _ C3 _ C4 _ H jKÞ ¼ 1;moreover (for i ¼ 1; 5) f ðCijC1 _ C2 _ C5Þ ¼ f ðC1 _ C5jC1 _ C2 _ C5Þ ¼ 0, f ðC2jC1 _ C2 _ C5Þ ¼ f ðC2_
CijC1 _ C2 _ C5Þ ¼ f ðC1 _ C2 _ C5jC1 _ C2 _ C5Þ ¼ 1; and f ðC1jC1 _ C5Þ ¼ 0:2; f ðC5jC1 _ C5Þ ¼ 0:3; f ðC1_
C5jC1 _ C5Þ ¼ 1.
We can prove that the above function is a conditional belief since there exists a suitable class fPl0; Pl1g of
plausibilities such that, for any EjF 2AH, one has f ðEjF Þ ¼ 1 PlaðEc^F ÞPlaðF Þ . The function Pl0 is deﬁned onA
as follows: for any H 	 C1 _ C5Pl0ðHÞ ¼ 0; Pl0ðC2Þ ¼ Pl0ðC2 _ HÞ ¼ 0:8; Pl0ðC4Þ ¼ Pl0ðC4 _ HÞ ¼ 0:2;
Pl0ðC3Þ ¼ Pl0ðC3 _ HÞ ¼ Pl0ðC3 _ C4Þ ¼ Pl0ðC3 _ C4 _ HÞ ¼ 0:5;
Pl0ðC2 _ C3Þ ¼ Pl0ðC2 _ C3 _ HÞ ¼ Pl0ðC2 _ C4Þ ¼ Pl0ðC2 _ C4 _ HÞ;
¼ Pl0ðC2 _ C3 _ C4Þ ¼ Pl0ðC2 _ C3 _ C4 _ HÞ ¼ 1:
Note that Pl0 is associated to the following basic assignment m on A: mðC2Þ ¼ 0:5;mðC2 _ C3Þ ¼
0:3;mðC3 _ C4Þ ¼ 0:2 and it is zero otherwise.
Then, H 01 ¼ C1 _ C5 is the greatest event ofH such that its plausibility under Pl0 is 0, and Pl1 is deﬁned as
follows Pl1ðC1Þ ¼ 0:7; Pl1ðC5Þ ¼ 0:8; Pl1ðC1 _ C5Þ ¼ 1.
Results in the same style of the above theorem, characterizing conditional possibility and necessity in terms
of a class of unconditional possibilities, have been given in [5,6,17,18,20,33].
4. Relations locally representable by a conditional possibility
In the probabilistic framework, any comparative probability representable by a strictly positive probability
is also locally representable by a conditional probability. The converse is not true, as proved by the following
simple example involving the algebra spanned by only three atoms A; B; C, whose relation is locally repre-
sentable by a conditional probability, but not representable by a probability:;  A  B  C  A _ C  B _ C  A _ B _ C:
In a possibilistic framework indeed also the viceversa is true: the following results prove, in fact, that the
binary relations representable by a strictly positive possibility coincides with that locally representable by a
conditional possibility (both that deﬁned as in [31], and that deﬁned as in [5]). Moreover, this class coincides
with that containing binary relations representable by a T-conditional possibility, with T a strict t-norm (i.e.
strictly monotone and continue [22]).
Theorem 7. Let  be an binary relation on the algebra A. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(a)  satisfies axiom (1), (2*), (3), (PO);
(b) there exists a conditional possibility PðjÞ :A ðA n ;Þ ! ½0; 1 locally representing ;
(c) there exists a T-conditional possibility PðjÞ :A ðA n ;Þ ! ½0; 1, with T a strict triangular norm,
locally representing ;
(d) there exists a strictly positive (unconditional) possibility PðÞ :A! ½0; 1 representing .Proof. (b)) (a), The relation  is reﬂexive, since PðAjAÞ ¼ 1 for any A 2A. Now, suppose that A  B and
B  C, we need to prove that A  C. We have thatPðAjA _ B _ CÞ ¼ minfPðAjA _ BÞ;PðA _ BjA _ B _ CÞg 6 minfPðBjA _ BÞ;PðA _ BjA _ B _ CÞg
¼ PðBjA _ B _ CÞ;
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¼ PðCjA _ B _ CÞ;hencePðAjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PðBjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PðCjA _ B _ CÞ:
If PðA _ CjA _ B _ CÞ ¼ 1, thenPðAjA _ CÞ ¼ PðAjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PðCjA _ B _ CÞ ¼ PðCjA _ CÞ:
Otherwise, PðBjA _ B _ CÞ ¼ 1, then PðAjA _ B _ CÞ 6 1 ¼ PðCjA _ B _ CÞ, that implies PðCjA _ CÞ ¼
1P PðAjA _ CÞ.
Thus transitivity of  follows. Hence,  is a weak order.
The relation  axiom (2*) since PðAjAÞ ¼ 1 > Pð;jAÞ, for every possible event A, hence ;  A.
Now, we need to prove that  satisﬁes axiom (PO): let A  B, it means PðAjA _ BÞ 6 PðBjA _ BÞ, by
monotonicity of min it followsPðAjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PðBjA _ B _ CÞ
and from the properties of possibility (being PðjA _ B _ CÞ a possibility)PðA _ CjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PðB _ CjA _ B _ CÞ;
which implies A _ C  B _ C.
(c)) (a) Reﬂexivity of  follows analogously to the previous step. To prove transitivity, consider A  B
and B  C, through monotonicity of T we getPðAjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PðBjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PðCjA _ B _ CÞ:
Moreover, being T a strict t-normPðAjA _ CÞ 6 PðCjA _ CÞ, so transitivity of  follows. Thus,  is a weak
order.
Axiom (2*) as well as axiom (PO) follows as in the previous step.
(a)) (b) Let C ¼ fC1; . . . ;Cng be a set of atoms of A and suppose that they are ordered in a way that
Ci  Ciþ1 for any i ¼ 1; . . . ; n 1; this is possible since  is transitive. We can rename the atoms as follows:
C11  C12      C1m1  C21      C2m2      Cs1      Csms(obviously
Ps
r¼1mr ¼ n).
Now, we deﬁne f0 on C as follows:f0ðCijÞ ¼ is
and we extend f0 on A by putting f0ð;Þ ¼ 0 andf0ðAÞ ¼ max
Cij	A
f0ðCijÞ:Note that axioms (1), (2*) and (PO) imply that Csj  X for any j ¼ 1; . . . ;ms.
Hence, f0 on A is a possibility.
Let us consider the conditional possibility deﬁned on A ðA n ;Þ starting from f0 as follows:PðAjBÞ ¼ f0ðA ^ BÞ if f 0ðA ^ BÞ < f0ðBÞ;
1 if f 0ðA ^ BÞ ¼ f0ðBÞ:
Now, we need to prove that P locally represents .
Note that PðCijjCij _ CkrÞ ¼ is for i < k, that means Cij  Ckr, moreover PðCijjCij _ CirÞ ¼ 1 for Cij  Cir.
Let A;B 2A with A  B, then there exist an atom C 	 Ac ^ B with A  C: in fact, if there is no such atom
C, then there would exist Cj 	 A with C  Cj for any C 	 B and axiom (PO) would imply B  A, so we get a
contradiction. HencePðAjA _ BÞ < 1 ¼ PðBjA _ BÞ. If A  B, then there exist Ci;Cj (possibly coincident) such
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construction PðAjA _ BÞ ¼ 1.
(a)) (c) Axiom (2*) implies non-triviality of , then  is representable by a possibility function Po by a
result in [30]. Moreover, by axiom (2*) it follows that PðAÞ > 0 for any A 2A, so it deﬁnes uniquely a T-
conditional possibility, with T strict triangular norm, onA ðA n f;gÞ which represents locally : in fact, if
A  B, then PoðAÞ 6 PoðBÞ and, since PoðA _ BÞ > 0, PoðAjA _ BÞ 6 PoðBjA _ BÞ.
(a) () (d) This equivalence has been essentially proved in [30].
The following example shows that relations locally representable by a conditional necessity can violate
transitivity. h
Example 8. Let A be an algebra spanned by three logical independent events A;B;C (it means that all the
events of the form A ^ B ^ C – where A, analogously B;C, stands for A or Ac – are possible) and consider
the following possibility distribution:pðA ^ B ^ CÞ ¼ pðAc ^ Bc ^ CcÞ ¼ 1
10
; pðAc ^ B ^ CÞ ¼ pðAc ^ Bc ^ CÞ ¼ 1
5
;
pðA ^ B ^ CcÞ ¼ pðA ^ Bc ^ CcÞ ¼ 1
2
; pðA ^ Bc ^ CÞ ¼ pðAc ^ B ^ CcÞ ¼ 1:Then, PðAc^BÞ¼PðB^CcÞ¼PðAc^B^CcÞ¼ 1¼PðA^Bc^CÞ¼PðA^BcÞ¼PðBc^CÞ and PðAc ^ CÞ ¼
1
5
;PðA ^ CcÞ ¼ 1
2
, so it follows PðAc ^ BjA _ BÞ ¼ PðA ^ BcjA _ BÞ ¼ PðBc ^ CjB _ CÞ ¼ PðB ^ CcjB _ CÞ ¼
1, PðAc ^ CjA _ CÞ ¼ 1
5
;PðA ^ CcjA _ CÞ ¼ 1
2
, which implies that the induced conditional necessity is such
thatNðAjA _ BÞ ¼ 1PðAc ^ BjA _ BÞ ¼ 0 ¼ 1PðA ^ BcjA _ BÞ ¼ NðBjA _ BÞ;
NðBjB _ CÞ ¼ 1PðBc ^ CjB _ CÞ ¼ 0 ¼ 1PðB ^ CcjB _ CÞ ¼ NðCjB _ CÞ;
NðAjA _ CÞ ¼ 1PðAc ^ CjA _ CÞ ¼ 4
5
;
NðCjA _ CÞ ¼ 1PðA ^ CcjA _ CÞ ¼ 1
2
:The relation  induced (or equivalently locally representable) by the above conditional necessity is such that
A  B;B  C; but C  Athus the transitivity property does not hold.
Nevertheless, the lack of transitivity is not necessarily a negative aspect, as there exist various frameworks
that allow for gradual relations and associated notions of transitivity that are compatible with the presence of
cycles (see e.g. [23,24,42]). In fact, it is well known that local comparisons can result in non-transitivity of both
preference and indiﬀerence (see for instance [3,27,39]).
5. Relations locally representable by a conditional plausibility
The following characterization shows that the binary relations locally representable by means of a condi-
tional plausibility, where conditioning is obtained through the product rule, coincide with those representable
by a strictly positive plausibility.
We recall the following axiom, the dual of (b) introduced in [7]:
(**) for every A;B;H 2A with A  B and A _ H ¼ X
A  B) ðA ^ HÞ  ðB ^ HÞ:The following result proves that the above axiom is essentially equivalent to (pl).
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statements are equivalent:
•  satisfies (pl);
•  satisfies (**).Proof. Suppose that  satisﬁes (pl). If there exist A;B;H 2A with A  B and A _ H ¼ X such that A  B and
A ^ H  B ^ H , then by (pl) ðA ^ HÞ _ K  ðB ^ HÞ _ K for any K 2A with K ^ ðB ^ HÞ ¼ ;. Consider
K ¼ Hc, since A _ H ¼ X implies K 	 A,A ¼ ðA ^ HÞ _ K  ðB ^ HÞ _ K ¼ B
follows and a contradiction arises, then (**) must hold.
Now, suppose that  satisﬁes (**). If there exist A;B;C 2A with A  B and B ^ C ¼ ; such that A  B and
A _ C  B _ C, then, consider H ¼ Cc (so H _ ðA _ CÞ ¼ X), axiom (**) impliesA ¼ A ^ Cc  B ^ Cc ¼ B
that contradicts the hypothesis, so (pl) holds.
We recall that a relation  satisﬁes conditions (1), (2), (3) and (pl) if and only if  is representable by a
plausibility (see Theorem 3 in [7]). On the other hand, as proved [45] conditions (1), (2), (3) and (b) are
necessary and suﬃcient for the representability of a relation on a ﬁnite algebra by means of a belief
function. h
Theorem 10. Let  be a binary relation on the algebra A. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(a)  satisfies axioms (1), (2*), (3), (pl);
(b)  satisfies axioms (1), (2*), (3), (**);
(c) there exists a conditional plausibility PlðjÞ :A ðA n ;Þ ! ½0; 1 locally representing ;
(d) there exists a strictly positive plausibility PlðÞ :A! ½0; 1 representing .Proof. (a) () (b): Axiom (2*) implies non-triviality of  and the thesis follows from Proposition 9.
(c) )(a): If A  B and B  C, since PlðjÞ represents locally , it follows PlðAjA _ BÞ 6 PlðBjA _ BÞ and
PlðBjB _ CÞ 6 PlðCjB _ CÞ. Then,
PlðAjA _ B _ CÞ ¼ PlðAjA _ BÞPlðA _ BjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PlðBjA _ BÞPlðA _ BjA _ B _ CÞ ¼ PlðBjA _ B _ CÞand, analogously, PlðBjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PlðCjA _ B _ CÞ.
Then, PlðAjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PlðBjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PlðCjA _ B _ CÞ, so by the plausibility’s properties
PlðCjA _ B _ CÞ > 0. Hence, PlðA _ CjA _ B _ CÞ > 0 holds and PlðAjA _ B _ CÞ 6 PlðCjA _ B _ CÞ implies
PlðAjA _ CÞ 6 PlðCjA _ CÞ, that means A  C. Then  axiom (1).
Being PlðAjAÞ ¼ 1 for any A 2A with A 6¼ ;, it follows the validity of axiom (2*).
Since PlðjHÞ for any H 2 ðA n ;Þ is a monotone function, it follows that, for any A;G 2A with A  G,
PlðAjGÞ 6 PlðGjGÞ, so A  G and  is monotone.
Now, if PlðAjGÞ ¼ PlðGjGÞ ¼ 1 for A  G, then for H 2A with G ^ H ¼ ; one hasPlðG _ H jG _ HÞ ¼ PlððA _ GÞ _ H jG _ HÞ 6 PlðA _ H jH _ GÞ þ PlðGjG _ HÞ  PlðAjG _ HÞ
¼ PlðA _ H jH _ GÞ þ PlðGjG _ HÞ  PlðAjGÞPlðGjG _ HÞ ¼ PlðA _ H jH _ GÞ:Therefore, from monotonicity it follows PlðG _ H jG _ HÞ ¼ PlðA _ H jH _ GÞ.
(a)) (c): Since  satisﬁes axioms (1), (2), (3) and (pl), then  is representable by a plausibility function Plo
as recalled above. Moreover, by axiom (2*) it follows that PlðAÞ > 0 for any A 2A, so it deﬁnes uniquely a
conditional plausibility on A ðA n f;gÞ which represents locally : in fact, if A  B, then PloðAÞ 6 PloðBÞ
and, since PloðA _ BÞ > 0, PloðAjA _ BÞ 6 PloðBjA _ BÞ.
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The above result shows that, analogously to the possibilistic case, the relations locally representable by a
conditional plausibility coincides with the class of those representable by a strict positive plausibility. h6. Relations locally representable by a conditional belief function
In this section we study relations locally representable by a conditional belief, taking into consideration
three diﬀerent deﬁnitions of conditional belief. The ﬁrst deﬁnition (based on generalized Dempster rule) is that
obtained as dual function of a conditional plausibility as deﬁned on Section 3 (for this we give a complete
characterization), the other ones are based on the product rule and the Bayes rule, respectively (for these
we only prove by examples the lack of transitivity).
6.1. Conditioning through dempster rule
The following result shows that any relations locally representable by a (Dempster) conditional belief func-
tion BelDðjÞ needs to satisfy condition (cp).
Proposition 11. Let A be an algebra of events and BelDðjÞ be a conditional belief on A ðA n ;Þ. If  is a
relation on A locally representable by BelDðjÞ, then  satisfies axioms (1), (2*), (3), (cp).
Proof. If A  B and B  C, since BelDðjÞ locally represents , it follows PlðAcjA _ BÞP PlðBcjA _ BÞ and
PlðBcjB _ CÞP PlðCcjB _ CÞ. Then,PlðAcjA _ B _ CÞ ¼ PlðAcjA _ BÞPlðA _ BjA _ B _ CÞP PlðBcjA _ BÞPlðA _ BjA _ B _ CÞ
¼ PlðBcjA _ B _ CÞand, analogously, PlðBcjA _ B _ CÞP PlðCcjA _ B _ CÞ.
It follows by transitivity PlðAcjA _ B _ CÞP PlðCcjA _ B _ CÞ.
If PlðA _ CjA _ B _ CÞ ¼ 0, then PlðBjA _ B _ CÞ ¼ 1 ¼ PlðB _ CjA _ B _ CÞ and 0 ¼ PlðCjA _ B _ CÞ ¼
PlðCjB _ CÞ, which implies, being B  C, PlðBc ^ CjB _ CÞ ¼ 0P PlðB ^ CcjB _ CÞ, but a contradictions
arises, in fact 1 ¼ PlðB _ CjB _ CÞ 6 PlðCjB _ CÞ þ PlðB ^ CcjB _ CÞ ¼ 0.
Then, PlðA _ CjA _ B _ CÞ > 0, and PlðAcjA _ B _ CÞP PlðCcjA _ B _ CÞ implies PlðAcjA _ CÞP
PlðCcjA _ CÞ, so BelDðAjA _ CÞ 6 BelDðCjA _ CÞ, i.e. A  C. Thus,  satisﬁes axiom (1).
Being BelDðAjAÞ ¼ 1 for any A 2A with A 6¼ ;, it follows the validity of axiom (2*).
Since BelDðjHÞ for any H 2 ðA n ;Þ is a monotone function, it follows that, for any A;G 2A with A  G,
BelDðAjGÞ 6 BelDðGjGÞ, so A  G and  is monotone.
Now, we need to prove that  satisﬁes (cp).
If BelDðEjE _ F Þ 6 BelDðF jE _ F Þ, then PlðE ^ F cjE _ F Þ 6 PlðEc ^ F jE _ F Þ, soBelDðE _ H jE _ F _ HÞ ¼ 1 PlðEc ^ F jE _ F _ HÞ ¼ 1 PlðEc ^ F jE _ F ÞPlðE _ F jE _ F _ HÞ
6 1 PlðE ^ F cjE _ F ÞPlðE _ F jE _ F _ HÞ ¼ 1 PlðE ^ F cjE _ F _ HÞ
¼ BelDðF _ H jE _ F _ HÞ:If BelDðEjE _ F Þ < BelDðF jE _ F Þ, then PlðE ^ F cjE _ F Þ < PlðEc ^ F jE _ F Þ.It follows that BelDðE_
H jE _ F _ HÞ < BelDðF _ H jE _ F _ HÞ iﬀ PlðE _ F jE _ F _ HÞ > 0.
If BelDðH jH _ F Þ < 1, then PlðF jH _ F Þ > 0 and PlðF _ H jE _ H _ F Þ > 0. In fact, PlðF _ H jE _ H _ F Þ ¼
0 would imply PlðEc ^ F jE _ H _ F Þ ¼ 0 ¼ PlðEc ^ F jE _ F ÞPlðE _ F jE _ H _ F Þ and (being PlðEc^
F jE _ F Þ > 0) one would get PlðE _ F jE _ H _ F Þ ¼ 0. However, both the equalities PlðF _ H jE _ H _ F Þ ¼
0 and PlðE _ F jE _ H _ F Þ ¼ 0 cannot hold.
If BelDðH jH _ F Þ ¼ BelDðF jH _ F Þ, then PlðH jH _ F Þ ¼ PlðF jH _ F ÞP 12 and so BelDðH jH _ F Þ < 1 and
so PlðF jH _ F Þ > 0 and PlðF _ H jE _ H _ F Þ > 0. Then, the thesis follows since PlðE _ F jE _ H _ F ÞP
PlðF jE _ H _ F Þ ¼ PlðF jH _ F ÞPlðF _ H jE _ H _ F Þ > 0. h
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H  G  H _ G, then H ^ G 6¼ ; and H ^ G  H _ G.
Proof. If H ^ G ¼ ;, then, since (2*) implies ;  G and being H  G by (cp) it follows H  H _ G, which con-
tradicts the hypothesis. Thus, H ^ G 6¼ ;.
Suppose H ^ G  H _ G, by transitivity H ^ G  G (being G  H  H _ G).
If H ^ Gc  H _ G, then by axiom (cp) from H ^ G  G one would get H  H _ G. Otherwise, if
H ^ Gc  H _ G  G, then again by axiom (cp) H ^ G  G implies H  H _ G. Hence, the thesis follows.
Note that axiom (cp) is stronger than axiom (3) and it implies for A;B;B 2A with A 	 B 	 CA  B) A _ ðBc ^ CÞ  C: ð2Þ
The following result shows that the characteristic axiom for relations representable by a conditional belief
function BelD is actually (cp). h
Theorem 13. Let  be a binary relation on the algebra A. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(a)  satisfies axiom (1), (2*), (cp);
(b) there exists a conditional belief BelDðjÞ :A ðA n ;Þ ! ½0; 1 locally representing .
Proof. (b)) (a): see Proposition 11.
(a)) (b): if  onA satisﬁes axioms (1), (2*), (cp), consider the set of events E0 ¼ fK 2A : K  Xg. From
monotonicity with respect to inclusion (implied by axiom (cp)) if K 2 E0, then, for any H 2A such that
K  H , H  X. Moreover, if K;K 0 2 E0, then it follows from Proposition 12 that ðK ^ K 0Þ 2 E0. It follows,
that the event H0 ¼ ^K2E0K is such that H0  X.
Let us deﬁne starting from  a binary relation 0 deﬁned on A as follows: A 0 B iﬀ
ðBc ^ H 0Þ  ðAc ^ H 0Þ. Hence, for any A 	 Hc0 one has A 0 ;; for any A with H 0 	 A A 0 X, since
Ac ^ H 0 ¼ ;; moreover for any A with H0 6¼ A ^ H0 6¼ ;, it follows ; 0 A 0 X. Furthermore, A 0 A ^ H 0 for
any event A 2A.
The relation 0 is non-trivial by axiom (2*) of . The relation 0 is a weak order: it is reﬂexive and
complete being  reﬂexive and complete, while transitivity holds since if A 0 B and B 0 C, then
Cc ^ H0  Bc ^ H0 and Bc ^ H 0  Ac ^ H 0 and by transitivity of  one has Cc ^ H 0  Ac ^ H 0, which implies
A 0 C.
For any pair of events A;B 2A with A 	 B, i.e. Bc ^ H 0 	 Ac ^ H0, by monotonicity of  one has Bc  Ac,
which implies A 0 B. Then 0 is monotone with respect to inclusion.
Let A;B 2A be such that A  B and A 0 B (it means B ^ H 0 6¼ ;), so Bc ^ H0  Ac ^ H 0. From
monotonicity of 0 with respect to inclusion, one has A _ K 0 B _ K for any K 2A. Let B ^ K ¼ ;, if
A _ K 0 B _ K, then Ac ^ Kc  Bc ^ Kc and axiom (cp) would imply ðAc ^ KcÞ _ K  ðBc ^ KcÞ _ K, i.e.
Ac  Bc and Ac ^ H0  Bc ^ H0, so a contradiction arises. Therefore, A _ K 0 B _ K for any K 2A with
B ^ K ¼ ;.
Thus, 0 is a weak order onA such that ; 0 A for any A 2A, and it satisﬁes the characteristic axiom of
comparative belief, hence it is representable by a belief function. Given such belief function representing ,
consider its dual function Pl0, which is a plausibility. Since A 0 X for any A+H 0, one has Pl0ðBÞ > 0 for any
B ^ H 0 6¼ ;.
c c Wj1 cNow, if H0(X, consider E1 ¼ fK  H0 : K  H 0g and H1 ¼ ^K2E1K. Moreover, Ej ¼ fK  ð i¼0HiÞ :
K  ðWj1i¼0HiÞcg is built analogously as well as Hj ¼ VK2EjK, till ðWj1i¼0HiÞ(X. BeingA ﬁnite also the number
of sets Ej is ﬁnite. Proposition 12 implies Hj  ð
Wj1
i¼0HiÞc.
Deﬁne for any j ¼ 1; . . . ; k a relation j onA as follows: A j B iﬀ Bc ^ Hj  Ac ^ Hj, for any A;B 2A.
Hence, ;jHcj ; while ;jAjX for Hj 6¼ A ^ Hj 6¼ ;; moreover A 0 X for Hj 	 A. The relation j is a
comparative belief: the proof goes in the same line of that given for 0. Then, j is representable by a belief,
moreover its dual function Plj is a plausibility such that PljðBÞ > 0 for any event B 2A with B ^ Hj 6¼ ;.
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locally represents . For any pair of events A;B 2 A, there exists a unique j such that ðA _ BÞ ^ Hj 6¼ ; and
ðA _ BÞ ^ Hi ¼ ; for any i ¼ 0; . . . ; j 1. Then, by construction ;iAiB for any i ¼ 0; . . . ; j 1 and A j B iﬀ
Bc ^ Hj  Ac ^ Hj.
If A  B, then A ^ Bc  Ac ^ B. In fact, if Ac ^ B  A ^ Bc hold, then (cp) would imply B  A, that
contradicts the hypothesis. Let j 2 f0; . . . ; kg be such that ðA _ BÞ ^ Hi ¼ ; for i ¼ 0; . . . ; j 1 and
ðA _ BÞ ^ Hj 6¼ ;. Then, ðA _ BÞ 	 Hci (for i ¼ 0; . . . ; j 1) and since HiiX and there is a belief function
representing i, one has that its dual function Pli is such that PliðHci Þ ¼ 0, which implies PliðA _ BÞ ¼ 0.
Moreover, since ðA _ BÞ ^ Hj 6¼ ;, then ;jA _ B, that implies PljðAc ^ BcÞ < 1 and PljðA _ BÞ > 0.
Hence, A ^ Bc  Ac ^ B and A _ BcjAc _ B and, since there is a belief representing j, one has that its dual
function is such that PljðAc ^ BÞ > PljðA ^ BcÞ. Therefore,BelDðAjA _ BÞ ¼ 1 PlðAc ^ BjA _ BÞ ¼ 1 PljðA
c ^ BÞ
PljðA _ BÞ < 1
PljðA ^ BcÞ
PljðA _ BÞ ¼ BelDðBjA _ BÞ: Now, if A  B, i.e. Bc j Ac, then PljðBÞP PljðAÞ.
If A ^ B ¼ ;, thenBelDðAjA _ BÞ ¼ 1 PlðBjA _ BÞ ¼ 1 PljðBÞPljðA _ BÞ 6 1
PljðAÞ
PljðA _ BÞ ¼ BelDðBjA _ BÞ:Otherwise (i.e. A ^ B 6¼ ;), the following situations can occur either A ^ B  A or A ^ B  A.
If A ^ B  A, then by axiom (cp) A ^ Bc  Ac ^ B; so A _ Bc j Ac _ B and PljðAc ^ BÞP PljðA ^ BcÞ andBelDðAjA _ BÞ ¼ 1 PlðAc ^ BjA _ BÞ ¼ 1 PljðA
c ^ BÞ
PljðA _ BÞ 6 1
PljðA ^ BcÞ
PljðA _ BÞ ¼ BelDðBjA _ BÞ:Suppose now A ^ B  A. If A ^ Bc  Ac ^ B, then A _ Bc j Ac _ B, so again PljðA ^ BcÞ 6 PljðAc ^ BÞ, further-
more PlðA ^ BcjA _ BÞ 6 PlðAc ^ BjA _ BÞ, which impliesBelDðAjA _ BÞ 6 BelDðBjA _ BÞ:
Otherwise (i.e. Ac ^ B  A ^ Bc) axiom (cp) implies A ^ Bc  A ^ B since A ^ B  A, then again from axiom
(cp) it follows that A  B and by transitivity A ^ B  A _ B. Moreover, from axiom (cp) implication ( 2) de-
rives and ðA ^ BÞ _ ðAc ^ Bc ^ KÞ  K for A _ B 	 K. In particular by taking K ¼ ðA _ B _ HjÞ, then K  Hj,
which implies Hj 	 K and by construction Hj 	 ðA ^ BÞ _ ðAc ^ BcÞ, so ðA ^ BÞ _ ðAc ^ BcÞjX. Since Plj is the
dual function of a belief representing j it follows PlððA ^ BcÞ _ ðAc ^ BÞÞ ¼ 0. Hence A  B and
BelDðAjA _ BÞ ¼ 1 ¼ BelDðBjA _ BÞ.
Remark. We recall that a strict relation is locally representable by a conditional probability if and only if it is
representable by (strictly positive) probability.
This result does not hold for (strict) relations locally representable by a conditional belief function, as
shown by the following simple example:
Example 14. Let A; B; C be the elements of a partition of X andA be the algebra spanned by them. Consider
the following relation on A;  A  B  C  A _ B  B _ C  A _ C  X:
This relation satisﬁes condition (b) and so it is representable by a (strictly positive) belief function. However,
axiom (cp) fails since A  B, but B _ C  A _ C.
Vice versa, as in probabilistic framework, there are relations locally representable by a conditional belief
function, but not representable by a belief function as shown in the following example.
Example 15. Let A; B; C; D; E; K be the elements of a partition of X and A be the algebra spanned by
them. We consider onA a binary relation such that Kc  K, for every H 2A with K  H , K  H , moreover
for the events contained in Kc  coincides with the relation of the well-known example of Kraft et al. [37].
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positive) probability; however it is representable by a belief function [13,19].
The relation  deﬁned above is not representable by a belief function since axiom (b) fails on all the events
containing K (e.g. ;  A and K  A _ K); indeed there is no 0-monotone function representing it, in fact the
characterizing axiom fails [7,8].
On the contrary the relation  satisﬁes axiom (cp) (but not (p)), hence it is locally representable by a
conditional belief function.
The above example proves that the class of relations locally representable by a conditional probability is
strictly contained on that locally representable by a conditional belief function.
6.2. Conditioning through product rule
In the following example we show that a relation  representable locally by a conditional belief (obtained
by means of the usual product as conditioning operation, i.e. BelP ðA ^ BjHÞ ¼ BelP ðAjB ^ HÞBelP ðBjHÞ) can
violate transitivity property (the lack is caused by the presence of events with null belief).
Example 16. Let A be the algebra spanned by three logical independent events A; B; C and consider the
following assessment:uðAÞ ¼ uðBÞ ¼ uðCÞ ¼ uðA _ CÞ ¼ 0; uðA _ BÞ ¼ uðB _ CÞ ¼ 1
7
; uðXÞ ¼ 1;
uðA _ B _ CÞ ¼ 2
7
; uðAjA _ BÞ ¼ uðBjA _ BÞ ¼ uðBjB _ CÞ ¼ uðCjB _ CÞ ¼ 0;
uðAjA _ CÞ ¼ 1
5
; uðCjA _ CÞ ¼ 1
10
;which is a conditional belief: in fact we can consider the following sequence of basic assessments m1 on A
which is deﬁned as follows (we will omit the symbol of intersection between events when no confusion
occurs)m0ðABC _ AcBcCcÞ ¼ m0ðAcBC _ AcBcCcÞ ¼ m0ðAcBCc _ AcBcCcÞ ¼ m0ðA _ BÞ ¼ m0ðA _ BÞ
¼ m0ðABCc _ ABcCc _ AcBcCcÞ ¼ m0ðABCc _ ABcC _ AcBcCcÞ ¼ 1
7and zero otherwise; while m1 is deﬁned on a suitable set and it is such thatm1ðACÞ ¼ 1
10
; m1ðACcÞ ¼ 1
10
; m1ðA _ CÞ ¼ 4
5and zero otherwise.
The relation  locally induced by the above conditional belief is such thatA  B; B  C
but C  A, then the transitivity of the symmetric part does not hold and this implies that is not an equiva-
lence relation.
Analogously, C  A and A  B do not imply C  B.
However, we have also the following result related to P-conditional belief, i.e. obtained through product
rule:
Proposition 18. Let BelP ðjÞ be a P-conditional belief and  a relation locally representable by BelP ðjÞ. Then,
A  B;B  C and Ac ^ Cc  A _ C ) A  C:Proof. Under the above hypothesis BelP ðAjA _ BÞ 6 BelP ðBjA _ BÞ, BelP ðBjB _ CÞ 6 BelP ðCjB _ CÞ and
BelP ðA _ CÞ > 0. From BelðAÞ 6 BelðBÞ 6 BelðCÞ if follows BelP ðAjA _ CÞ 6 BelP ðCjA _ CÞ. h
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As proved by the following example also a relation  representable locally by a conditional belief (obtained
by means of the so called Bayes rule as conditioning operator) can be non-transitive, on the contrary in this
case the intransitive cycles are not due to the zero values, but are obtained in a totally positive context.
Example 18. Consider the following basic assignment on the algebra spanned by the logical independent
events A;B;C:mðABCÞ ¼ 1
10
; mðABc _ AcBCÞ ¼ 3
10
; mðBCc _ ABcCcÞ ¼ 1
5and m is 0 otherwise. We getBelBðAjA _ BÞ ¼ BelðAÞBelðAÞ þ PlðAcBÞ ¼
1=10
1=10þ 5=10 ¼
1
6
¼ BelðBÞ
BelðBÞ þ PlðABcÞ ¼ BelBðBjA _ BÞ;
BelBðBjB _ CÞ ¼ BelðBÞBelðBÞ þ PlðBcCÞ ¼
1=10
1=10þ 3=10 ¼
1
4
;
BelBðCjB _ CÞ ¼ BelðCÞBelðCÞ þ PlðBCcÞ ¼
1=10
1=10þ 1=5 ¼
1
3
;
BelBðAjA _ CÞ ¼ BelðAÞBelðAÞ þ PlðAcCÞ ¼
1=10
1=10þ 3=10 ¼
1
4
;
BelBðCjA _ CÞ ¼ BelðCÞBelðCÞ þ PlðACcÞ ¼
1=10
1=10þ 5=10 ¼
1
6
:Hence, by taking the relation  induced locally by the above conditional belief we get A  B; B  C, but
C  A, this implies that the relation violates transitivity.7. Conclusion
We face the local representability problem of relations by some well-known conditional measures such as
possibility, necessity, belief function and plausibility. This analysis gives a new perspective to some condition-
ing operation: in fact, it puts in evidence the lack of transitivity, e.g. for relations locally representable by a
conditional necessity or by a conditional belief, when conditioning is obtained through product rule or Bayes
rule.
Moreover, we show that transitivity is satisﬁed by relations locally representable by conditional possibili-
ties, conditional plausibilities and conditional belief functions, if we use for them as conditioning rule a gen-
eralization of Dempster rule. The proposed characterizations in terms of necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for the local representability of a binary relation put in evidence some subtle properties among diﬀerent
choices of conditioning and between ‘‘local representability’’ and ‘‘representability’’: for possibility measures
we prove that diﬀerent conditioning rules are not distinguishable in a comparative setting. Furthermore, for
possibility and plausibility it comes out that a relation is locally representable if and only if it is representable
by a strict positive unconditional measure. The above characterizations give rise to a fundamental diﬀerence
among these measures and probability: binary relations representable by a strict positive probability are also
locally representable by a conditional probability, while the converse is not true.
The characterization of relations locally representable by a conditional belief function, when conditioning
generalizes Dempster rule, puts in evidence the particular similarity between this conditional belief function
and conditional probability: in fact one of the required condition is the local additive condition (cp), necessary
for conditional probability and which is not a weakening of condition (b), characterizing relations represent-
able by a belief function.
282 G. Coletti, B. Vantaggi / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 47 (2008) 268–283Moreover, by Example 14 we show that there are strict relation violating (cp), but representable by a belief
function. On the contrary Example 15 proves that a binary relations, locally representable by a conditional
belief, is not necessarily representable by belief functions.
References
[1] R.J. Aumann, Utility theory without the completeness axiom, Econometrica 30 (3) (1962) 445–461.
[2] B. Ben Yaghlane, P. Smets, K. Mellouli, About conditional belief function independence, in: Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches
to Reasoning with Uncertainty, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., 2143, Springer, Berlin, 2001, pp. 340–349.
[3] S. Bernardi, G. Coletti, A conditional decision model, in: Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci.,
2143, Springer, Berlin, 2001, pp. 108–119.
[4] B. Bouchon-Meunier, G. Coletti, C. Marsala, Possibilistic conditional events, in: Proc. Information Processing and Management of
Uncertainty in knowledge-based systems (IPMU 2000), Madrid, 2000, pp. 1561–1566.
[5] B. Bouchon-Meunier, G. Coletti, C. Marsala, Independence and possibilistic conditioning, Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 35 (2002) 107–
124.
[6] B. Bouchon-Meunier, G. Coletti, C. Marsala, Conditional possibility and necessity, in: Bouchon-Meunier, Gutierre´z-Rions,
Magdalena, Yager (Eds.), Technologies for Constructing Intelligent Systems, Springer-Verlag, 2002, pp. 59–71.
[7] A. Capotorti, G. Coletti, B. Vantaggi, Non-additive ordinal relations representable by lower or upper probabilities, Kybernetika 34
(1) (1998) 79–90.
[8] A. Capotorti, G. Coletti, B. Vantaggi, Preferences representable by lower expectation: some characterizations, Theory and Decision,
in press (A short version is in Proc. FUR 06, Rome, 2006).
[9] G. Coletti, A weak coherence condition for conditional comparative probabilities, in: Bouchon-Meunier et al. (Eds.), Uncertainty in
Intelligent Systems, Elsevier Sci. Publ. BV, 1993, pp. 195–201.
[10] G. Coletti, Non-additive ordinal relations representable by conditional probabilities and its use in expert systems, in: Proc. of
IPMU’96, Granada, 1996, pp. 43–48.
[11] G. Coletti, M. Mastroleo, Conditional belief functions: a comparison among diﬀerent deﬁnitions, in: Proc. of WUPES 2006, Mikulov
(Czech Rep.), 2006, pp. 24–35.
[12] G. Coletti, G. Regoli, Probabilita´ qualitative non archimedee e realizzabilita´, Riv. Mat. Sci. Econom. Soc. 6 (1983) 79–99.
[13] G. Coletti, R. Scozzafava, From conditional events to conditional measures: a new axiomatic approach, Ann. Math. Artif. Intell. 32
(2001) 373–392.
[14] G. Coletti, R. Scozzafava, Locally additive comparative probabilities, in: 2nd Int. Symp. on Imprecise Probabilities and Their
Applications (ISIPTA’01), Ithaca (New York), 2001, pp. 83–92.
[15] G. Coletti, R. Scozzafava, Probabilistic logic in a coherent setting, Trends in Logic, vol. 15, Kluwer, Dordrecht/Boston/London,
2002.
[16] G. Coletti, R. Scozzafava, Toward a general theory of conditional beliefs, Int. J. Intell. Syst. 21 (3) (2006) 229–259.
[17] G. Coletti, B. Vantaggi, Comparative conditional possibilities, in: Godo (Ed.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, LNAI 3571, 2005,
pp. 872–883.
[18] G. Coletti, B. Vantaggi, Possibility theory: conditional independence, Fuzzy Sets Syst. 57 (2006) 1491–1513.
[19] G. Coletti, B. Vantaggi, Representability of ordinal relations on a set of conditional events, Theory and Decision 60 (2006) 137–174.
[20] G. Coletti, B. Vantaggi, Comparative models ruled by possibility and necessity: a conditional world, Int. J. Approx. Reason. 45 (2007)
341–363.
[21] R.T. Cox, Probability, frequency and reasonable expectation, Am. J. Phys. 14 (1) (1946) 1–13.
[22] B. De Baets, E. Tsiporkova, R. Mesiar, Conditioning in possibility theory with strict order norms, Fuzzy Sets Syst. 106 (1999) 121–
129.
[23] B. De Baets, H. De Meyer, Transitivity frameworks for reciprocal relations: cycle-transitivity versus FG-transitivity, Fuzzy Sets Syst.
152 (2005) 249–270.
[24] B. De Baets, H. De Meyer, B. De Schuymer, S. Jenei, Cyclic evaluation of transitivity of reciprocal relations, Social Choice and
Welfare 26 (2006) 217–238.
[25] B. de Finetti, Sul signiﬁcato soggettivo della probabilita`, Fundam. Mat. 17 (1931) 293–329.
[26] B. de Finetti, Les probabilites nulles, Bull. Sci. Math. 60 (1936) 275–288.
[27] B. De Schuymer, H. De Meyer, B. De Baets, S. Jenei, On the cycle-transitivity of the dice model, Theory and Decision 54 (2003) 264–
285.
[28] A.P. Dempster, A generalization of Bayesian inference, The Royal Stat. Soc. B 50 (1968) 205–247.
[29] T. Denoeux, P. Smets, Classiﬁcation using belief functions: the relationship between the case-based and model-based approaches,
IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybernet. B 36 (2006) 1395–1406.
[30] D. Dubois, Belief structure, possibility theory and decomposable conﬁdence measures on ﬁnite sets, Comput. Artif. Intell. 5 (1986)
403–416.
[31] Dubois, H. Prade, Possibility Theory, Plenum Press, New York, 1988.
[32] D. Dubois, H. Prade, R. Sabbadin, Decision-theoretic foundations of qualitative possibility theory, Eur. J. Operat. Res. 128 (2001)
459–478.
G. Coletti, B. Vantaggi / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 47 (2008) 268–283 283[33] L. Ferracuti, B. Vantaggi, Independence and conditional possibilities for strictly monotone triangular norms, Int. J. Intell. Syst. 21 (3)
(2006) 299–323.
[34] J.Y. Jaﬀray, Bayesian updating and belief functions, IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybernet. 5 (1992) 1144–1152.
[35] E.P. Klement, R. Mesiar, E. Pap, Triangular Norms, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2000.
[36] B.O. Koopman, The axioms and algebra of intuitive probability, Ann. Math. 41 (1940) 269–292.
[37] C.H. Kraft, J.W. Pratt, A. Seidenberg, Intuitive probability on ﬁnite sets, Ann. Math. Stat. 30 (1959) 408–419.
[38] D.H. Krantz, R.D. Luce, P. Suppes, A. Tversky, Foundations of measurement, Additive and Polynomial Representations, vol. 1,
Academic Press, New York–London, 1971.
[39] D. Lehmann, Generalized qualitative probability: Savage revisited, Proc. UAI ’ 96 (1996) 381–388.
[40] K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientiﬁc Discovery, Routledge, London, 1959.
[41] A. Re´nyi, On conditional probability spaces generated by a dimensionally ordered set of measures, Theor. Probab. Appl. 1 (1956) 61–
71.
[42] R. Scozzafava, B. Vantaggi, Fuzzy relations in a coherent conditional probability setting, in: Proc. 7th International Conference on
Information and Management Sciences (IMS), Chengdu (China), 2006, pp. 496–500.
[43] P. Smets, Belief function and transferable belief model, Documentation of SIPTA, 2000, www.sipta.org/documentation/belief/
belief.ps.
[44] P. Walley, Belief function representations of statistical evidence, Ann. Stat. 4 (1987) 1439–1465.
[45] S.K.M. Wong, Y.Y. Yao, P. Bollmann, H.C. Burger, Axiomatization of qualitative belief structure, IEEE Trans. Systems Man
Cybernet. 21 (1991) 726–734.
